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Key points for policymakers 
The Twinning instrument in Ukraine, while being generally effective, has punched below its weight due 
to systemic weaknesses in its internal setup and a number of threats emanating from the domestic 
situation in Ukraine and the EU itself. In addition to the recent Twinning reform introduced by the 
European Commission, the Twinning instrument in Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region 
more generally can be improved further through enhanced flexibility, more targeted interventions, 
stronger individual and sectoral incentives for the beneficiary institution, and greater visibility. 
Policy recommendations 
 Re-conceptualise Twinning as a flexible toolkit, rather than a rigid instrument, by allowing for more 
flexibility in adjusting and updating project objectives during both the planning and implementation 
stages. 
 Cut down on the Twinning project preparation time by reducing the number of actors involved in 
the process of project approval and by speeding up the overall procedure. 
 Step up financial support for Twinning beneficiaries, which should involve domestic travel grants for 
local experts and cash bonuses for civil servants in accordance with the time and effort invested in 
the project. 
 Adopt a customised approach to each policy sector based on a rigorous analysis of the policy 
background and the reform priorities of the current leadership. The European Commission might 
consider issuing grants for more local experts to perform an in-depth gap analysis of existing 
legislation and sectoral policy needs. 
 Include more project visibility measures effectively communicating the objectives, benefits and the 
results of Twinning projects to a broader swathe of Twinning stakeholders. Twinning contracts and 
performance reports should also be made more accessible to the broader public, e.g. the research 
community and civil society. 
  Align the policy agenda of Twinning projects with the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, especially 
in traditionally low-key sectors (e.g. education and social care) and in sectors where the EU enjoys 
greater bargaining power (e.g. trade and industry). A clear and credible EU membership perspective 
will also likely improve the track record of future Twinning projects in Ukraine and other EaP 
countries. 
 Perform a more thorough analysis of Twinning projects in countries that were recipients of Twinning 
in the past so as to draw lessons and make subsequent projects in Ukraine and the EaP more 
effective. 
 Provide more avenues for coordination between Twinning projects and other initiatives by the EU 
and other international actors present in a particular policy sector. This coordination should also 
include domestic civil society organisations pushing for EU-backed reforms in respective sectors. 
 Make the process of selection of short-term experts for Twinning more rigorous and competitive, 
for example, through creating an EU-wide expert database, as has been done in TAIEX. 
The European Commission, in its recently updated Twinning manual, made an attempt to address some 
of these issues (see the concluding remarks for a brief overview). However, it will take further evaluation 
of the Twinning projects that kicked off after July 2017 in order to understand more comprehensively 
the impact of those changes on Twinning implementation in the future. 
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Twinning overview 
Twinning is an EU institution-building instrument that links civil servants from EU member 
states and non-EU countries, who work together on a specific reform agenda in line with 
existing bilateral agreements.1  Twinning participants commit themselves to a set of policy 
objectives, or mandatory results, which reflect the priorities of EU cooperation with third 
countries. Compared with other EU institution-building tools, such as TAIEX 2  or SIGMA, 3 
Twinning emphasises the comprehensiveness and long-term character of such cooperation. A 
typical Twinning project lasts up to three years from the moment of signing the contract until 
the last expert departs. Every project involves the secondment of a permanent expert, a 
resident twinning adviser, and dozens of short-term experts on the EU side and the beneficiary 
country’s officials on the recipient side. This personal, two-way character of Twinning 
cooperation makes it distinct from similar EU instruments, such as the Comprehensive 
Institution Building programme, which strengthens institutions in the beneficiary countries 
through targeted budget support yet creates few opportunities for the exchange of 
administrative experience face-to-face. 
Twinning boasts an extensive reach in different policy sectors, a comprehensive design and a 
unique cross-cultural experience for participating civil servants. Each project has a budget of 
approximately €1 million, entailing generous support for short- and long-term experts from EU 
member states who are available and willing to share their professional expertise with their 
counterparts from abroad. Originally introduced in 1998 to support the accession process of 
EU candidate countries, Twinning was extended in 2004 to offer institution-building support to 
the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) region. The objectives of Twinning projects in the EaP countries draw on the 
bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Action Plans and more recently Association 
Agreements (AAs), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). In 
applying for Twinning projects, the beneficiary countries also often rely on priorities from the 
National Indicative Programmes, Country Strategy Papers and other domestic initiatives 
relevant for approximation with EU law and regulatory standards. 
                                                        
1 Other terms commonly used for Twinning in the literature are capacity-building or transgovernmental coopera-
tion instruments. 
2 TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European Commission. 
3 SIGMA stands for Support for Improvement in Governance and Management. It is a joint initiative of the Euro-
pean Commission and the OECD. 
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Twinning in Ukraine 
Since the advent of the ENP, Ukraine has completed 45 Twinning projects, placing the country 
at the top in the EaP region (Figure 1).4 The sectoral distribution of Twinning projects in Ukraine 
has been rather wide, spanning sectors such as transport, finance, justice and home affairs, 
energy, agriculture and others (Figure 2). 
Our earlier analysis demonstrated that about half of the 32 Twinning projects analysed in 
Ukraine between 2007 and 2016 paved the way for a lasting change in the respective 
beneficiary organisations in line with EU norms.5 Among those Twinning projects that were 
effective, 63% resulted in legal convergence (the adoption of a law or amendment), 75% led to 
institutional convergence (successful implementation of a new law or a new administrative 
practice in the beneficiary institution) and 44% accomplished both.6 Thus, a significant number 
of Twinning projects have succeeded in encouraging the Ukrainian authorities to adopt and 
implement reforms in line with the EU acquis, along with associated secondary legislation and 
‘best practices’ from the public administration of EU member states. However, the other half 
of Twinning projects have for various reasons failed to trigger any legal or institutional 
convergence in Ukraine’s public sector. 
Figure 1. Twinning projects in the Eastern Partnership region, as of April 2018 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 
(DG NEAR), European Commission. 
                                                        
4 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are formally part of the Eastern Partnership, while Belarus 
(belonging to the same geographical region) is included in Figure 1 for comparison purposes only. 
5 Dmytro Panchuk, “Effectiveness of EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the Neighbourhood: Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis of Twinning Projects in Ukraine”, Europe–Asia Studies, forthcoming (2018). 
6 Ibid. 
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Figure 2. Twinning projects in Ukraine by policy sector, as of April 2018 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from DG NEAR, European Commission. 
Undertaking a SWOT analysis 
The following sections of this policy brief offer a SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats) of EU Twinning projects in Ukraine (Table 1).7 The strengths reflect 
those aspects of Twinning projects that are largely viewed as successful by Twinning 
stakeholders and which make these projects effective. Effectiveness is understood here as the 
degree of legal or institutional convergence (or both) of the beneficiary with relevant EU norms 
as a direct or indirect result of its participation in a Twinning project. The weaknesses refer to 
the perceived problems of Twinning projects, which hinder their effectiveness. 
While the strengths and weaknesses mostly reflect the structural characteristics of the 
Twinning project, threats and opportunities capture its external dimension through the various 
characteristics of the sending and the receiving sides, as well as the political environment. 
Threats refer to the political and institutional dynamics within the beneficiary country and the 
                                                        
7 This policy brief is part of a PhD project on EU transgovernmental cooperation through Twinning in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, which was finalised and defended at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University, in 2017. The 
policy brief draws on 50 interviews conducted between 2014 and 2017 with former participants of Twinning pro-
jects in Ukraine and other EaP countries, with the European Commission officials overseeing these projects, and 
with scholars working on the subject of Twinning. Interviewees came from various geographical locations (indi-
cated in respective footnotes) and organisations (the European Commission, public agencies of EU member states 
and Ukraine, mandated bodies and universities). Interviews were often complemented by pilot surveys inquiring 
about various aspects of Twinning implementation. All of the interviewees agreed to be quoted as part of this 
research in exchange for being granted anonymity. 
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EU that endanger the effective implementation of Twinning projects. The opportunities are the 
opposite of threats and refer to the political and institutional dynamics that facilitate the 
implementation of Twinning projects. Based on the SWOT analysis of Twinning projects in 
Ukraine since 2007, we provide a series of recommendations for the EU to include in its ongoing 
review of the Twinning instrument in the neighbourhood. 
Table 1. SWOT overview of Twinning projects in Ukraine 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
 Learning and 
socialisation forum 
showcasing EU norms 
and best practices in a 
variety of policy sectors 
 Establishment of long-
lasting professional ties 
between the public 
administrations of EU 
member states and 
Ukraine 
 Enriching personal 
experiences for 
Twinning participants 
 Long preparation 
times 
 Little flexibility in 
embracing change 
 Low level of financial 
incentives for the 
beneficiary side 
 Lack of strong 
sectoral conditionality 
 No membership 
perspective 
 Lack of proper policy 
planning and political 
analysis 
 Low visibility 
 High level of public 
support for Ukraine’s 
EU integration 
 Ukraine’s search for 
alternative trade 
markets 
 Record of 
accomplishment in 
past Twinning projects 
 Country- and sector-
based comparative 
advantages of the new 
and older EU member 
states 
 Coordination with 
other foreign actors 
and domestic civil 
society in the country 
and the policy sector 
 Turnover of public 
personnel at the senior 
and middle levels 
 ‘Red tape’ in the 
beneficiary institution 
 Frequent changes in the 
organisational structure 
of the beneficiary 
 Low morale among 
participating public 
servants 
 Russian aggression in 
the east of the country 
 Lack of qualifications or 
compatibility of experts  
 Cross-cultural 
communication barriers 
Source: Authors’ summary. 
 
Strengths 
The Twinning instrument offers a number of strengths that contribute to the legal and 
institutional convergence of the EaP countries and institutions to EU norms, enshrined in the 
acquis communautaire and best practices in public administration by EU member states. First 
of all, Twinning projects provide a long-term learning and socialisation platform, which enables 
participants to exchange professional experience in a specific policy sector over the course of 
two to three years. Simply transposing EU directives and regulations onto the recipient’s legal 
landscape is often insufficient if not followed by practical training in implementation. The 
invaluable experience of participating EU member states makes Twinning a great tool for 
helping the beneficiary countries not only formally adopt EU norms but also effectively 
implement them. As a rule, Twinning projects attract EU experts with a substantial track record 
in civil service in their home countries. Hence, these projects offer excellent learning 
opportunities for Ukrainian officials, the majority of whom only have a remote idea of the EU’s 
regulatory landscape. 
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The Twinning instrument is also about interpersonal communication and professional ties 
fostered at the transgovernmental level between civil servants from the EU and Ukraine. In the 
long run, these ties may bring about more opportunities for future cooperation, such as grants, 
study visits and follow-up exchanges. It is also common for successful Twinning projects to lead 
to new projects involving the same team and complementary objectives several years after the 
original project. Member state civil servants who participated in earlier Twinning projects in 
Ukraine are sometimes invited by the Ukrainian side at a later stage to contribute to ongoing 
reform efforts in the country, as happened in the case of the project supporting civil service 
development.8 In addition, the existing informal networks between the member state civil 
servants and their Ukrainian counterparts have contributed to the widening spectrum of 
bilateral cooperation in other policy areas and institutions. Research has also shown that the 
socialisation networks associated with the Twinning instrument may encourage democratic 
governance in the beneficiary institution through fostering greater transparency, accountability 
and participation.9 
Finally, involvement in a Twinning project has been a very fulfilling personal experience for 
many participating civil servants we interviewed. It allowed them to spend several years in a 
different country, learn about its people and culture, and embrace new perspectives towards 
their home country. Friendships forged during Twinning cooperation have often been lasting 
and productive, extending in time well after the completion of the project. 
Weaknesses 
Along with their strengths, Twinning projects have also manifested several systemic 
weaknesses, related to the process of their preparation and implementation. Based on our 
assessment, we distinguish seven such weaknesses. First, the average preparation time for a 
typical Twinning project is rather long. The preparation time can take up to two years, starting 
with the formulation of the terms of reference and drafting of the project fiche until the day 
the project is launched. Such an extended period may be explained by the significant number 
of actors (up to 20) involved in the process of project preparation.10 Nevertheless, this lag 
between the formulation of Twinning objectives and their implementation often makes them 
irrelevant for the beneficiary institution and the EU itself.11 Under such circumstances, the 
                                                        
8 Interview with a Polish civil servant, Warsaw, 2 April 2015. 
9 Tina Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation 
with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance”, in San-
dra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig (eds), Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to 
Governance? Vol. 18, Abingdon: Routledge (2013), 117–41; Dmytro Panchuk, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie, 
“The Substance of EU Democratic Governance Promotion via Transgovernmental Cooperation with the Eastern 
Neighbourhood”, Democratization 24 (6): 1044–65. 
10 Gérard Bouscharain and Jean-Bernard Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Coun-
tries Covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Final Report, European Commission and HTPSE (2012), 
188. 
11 Interview with a French expert, Paris, 5 April 2016. 
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administrative and financial management of Twinning projects also becomes problematic, 
especially in terms of securing the continued commitment of the project’s short-term experts 
several years down the line. 
Second, the problem of the long preparation time is exacerbated by the rigidity of the 
instrument itself. Once the original objectives have been formulated, it becomes very 
problematic and time-consuming to change them after the project has begun.12 The member 
state and the beneficiary may jointly request certain modifications during project 
implementation by means of side letters and addenda. Yet, these modifications mostly concern 
adjustments to the work plan, activities, deadlines or budgetary matters, and they may hardly 
contest the mandatory results agreed upon at the outset. Such inflexibility has often resulted 
in project participants being stuck with an outdated and irrelevant agenda, effectively hindering 
the project from reaching its goals.13 
Third, beneficiaries in Ukraine sometimes complained about the insufficient level of financial 
incentives offered by the Twinning instrument. Almost an entire Twinning budget is expended 
on the salaries of member state civil servants and the organisation of project-related activities 
(workshops, seminars, conferences and language services).14 The beneficiary civil servants are 
expected to commit to the project activities in their overtime and on a voluntary basis, in 
addition to an already heavy workload.15 The problem of the low salaries in the Ukrainian public 
sector becomes particularly acute at the interpersonal level, whereby the resident twinning 
adviser and other member state civil servants earn more money per diem than a Ukrainian civil 
servant does per month! This disparity in earnings, as well as difficulties managing multiple job 
responsibilities, has often led to tensions, implicit and explicit, between the partners over the 
course of several projects.16 
Furthermore, under the terms of Twinning, the beneficiary side is expected to designate office 
space, furnish it with the necessary equipment (computers, copy machines, phones, etc.) and 
pay for the domestic travel of local experts who participate in Twinning activities in Kyiv. The 
failure by some Ukrainian institutions to live up to those commitments has become a stumbling 
block for the respective projects and resulted in delays or the low turnout of Ukrainian experts 
for project activities. In some cases, the Twinning project could not start for several months 
because participants had no office space, internet or landline access. Since Twinning budgets 
                                                        
12 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument”, 37; Stefan Roch, “Between Ar-
bitrary Outcomes and Impeded Process: The Performance of EU Twinning Projects in the EU’s Eastern Neighbour-
hood”, East European Politics 33 (1): 75. 
13 Interview with a French civil servant, Moscow, 23 March 2016. 
14 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual”, Brussels (2012). 
15 Interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 21 November 2014. 
16 Interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 27 November 2014; interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 21 April 
2016. 
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normally do not cover these items, Twinning participants have often had to look for 
workarounds; some have even had to pay out of their own pockets.17 
Fourth, Twinning projects in virtually all policy sectors in Ukraine have suffered from a low level 
of political commitment to the project’s objectives. While partly attributable to the volatility of 
the Ukrainian political system, widespread conflicts of interest and meagre financial support by 
the state, this lack of commitment can also be traced to insufficient or ineffective conditionality 
by the EU in some policy sectors covered by Twinning. Both in the Action Plan and, more 
recently, in the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine, some policy sectors have received less attention in 
terms of ‘sticks and carrots’ from the EU. For example, the EU–Ukraine commitments in policy 
sectors such as social affairs, education and healthcare have been less explicit than those in 
trade, industry, energy and finance.18 Consequently, Twinning projects in the latter sectors 
have tended to be more effective in fostering the legal (and less so the institutional) 
convergence of the Ukrainian public sector with EU norms.19 
Fifth, the Twinning instrument in the ENP was modelled on accession conditionality, which 
drove the EU’s ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 and 2007.20 Because EU membership is not on 
the books for any of the ENP countries yet, they may be reluctant to embark on the often costly 
process of adopting EU norms in their domestic systems.21 This strategic shortcoming was also 
confirmed through our interviews with Twinning experts who worked in the ENP, Instrument 
for Pre-Accession (IPA) or the Eastern enlargement frameworks and noticed these disparities 
in the beneficiary’s motivation.22 
Sixth, Twinning practitioners pointed to inadequate background research behind some 
Twinning projects.23 In other words, some Twinning projects were planned and implemented 
without first ascertaining a solid commitment at the highest political level and gaining sufficient 
awareness of all the possible traps and pitfalls down the road. The limited expertise of some 
experts drafting project fiches has also resulted in difficulties accommodating the project 
objectives to the actual needs and capacities on the ground. 24  This problem has been 
                                                        
17 Interview with a Danish civil servant, Copenhagen, 21 March 2016. 
18 Interview with a French expert, Paris, 5 April 2016; interview with a Danish civil servant, Kyiv, 5 May 2015. 
19 Panchuk, “Effectiveness of EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the Neighbourhood”. 
20 Elsa Tulmets, “Institution-Building Instruments in the Eastern Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement?” East-
ern Partnership Review 6 (2011) (http://www.eceap.eu/ul/Review_No6.pdf); Roch, “Between Arbitrary Outcomes 
and Impeded Process”, 79. 
21 See also Hrant Kostanyan (ed.), Assessing European Neighbourhood Policy: Perspective from the Literature, 
Brussels and London: CEPS and Roman & Littlefield International (2017), 17–20 (https://www.ceps.eu/system/ 
files/ENP_LiteratureReviewWithCovers.pdf). 
22 Interview with a Dutch expert, The Hague, 3 April 2015; interview with a Danish civil servant, Copenhagen, 
23 March 2016. 
23 Interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 27 November 2014; interview with a Ukrainian civil servant, Kyiv, 10 
March 2016; interview with a Dutch civil servant, Amsterdam, 21 March 2016. 
24 Interview with a Ukrainian civil servant, Kyiv, 10 March 2016. 
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exacerbated by a lack of capacity to undertake a local needs analysis in a more precise and 
uniform manner across different policy sectors. 
And seventh, our interviewees suggested that the level of visibility of some Twinning projects 
was rather poor, which manifested itself in the limited awareness by Ukrainian civil servants of 
the benefits and expectations of Twinning cooperation. While the situation is somewhat better 
in policy areas related to the private sector (e.g. trade and industry, transport or statistics), 
Twinning projects in policy sectors related exclusively to the public sector (e.g. justice and home 
affairs) are not very widely known or understood outside their hosting institutions.25 
Opportunities 
We identify five major opportunities for the future exercise of the Twinning instrument in 
Ukraine. A first opportunity is the favourable stance of the country’s current leadership and 
population towards EU integration. One of the main triggers behind the Euromaidan protests 
in 2013 was the refusal of the then Yanukovych leadership to sign an AA with the EU. After the 
Revolution of Dignity that followed, Ukraine has implemented a number of impressive reforms 
in the areas of energy, banking, decentralisation, deregulation, healthcare and others, many of 
which have clearly been inspired and supported by the EU. It has already become a cliché to 
assert that Ukraine has carried out more reforms in the past four years than it had since its 
independence in 1991.26 Despite some recent warning signs of a slowdown in important anti-
corruption initiatives, many of Ukraine’s sectoral reforms – such as pension reform, healthcare 
reform, decentralisation and others – are firmly underway. By explicitly linking the policy 
agenda of Twinning projects with the sectoral priorities from the AA/DCFTA and duly rewarding 
progress made, the EU can speed up the convergence of the Ukrainian public sector with EU 
norms. 
Additionally, due to the conflict with Russia and the resulting disruption of trade, Ukraine has 
been looking for alternative markets and inevitably embracing closer integration with the EU.27 
As a consequence, in policy sectors such as energy, veterinary and phytosanitary regulation, 
and transport, Ukraine has few other alternatives but headlong orientation on the European 
Single Market. Identifying and cooperating in the policy sectors where Ukraine is likely to 
gravitate towards the EU should be a priority for Twinning policymakers. That also applies to 
Twinning projects in other EaP countries that seek to reduce their trade dependence on Russia 
and diversify their energy and export markets. 
                                                        
25 Interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 22 March 2016. 
26  European Parliament, “The State of Implementation of the Associations and Free Trade Agreements with 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova”, DG for External Policies (16 November 2017), 10. 
27 Laure Delcour, The EU and Russia in Their “Contested Neighbourhood”: Multiple External Influences, Policy Trans-
fer and Domestic Change, Abingdon: Taylor & Francis (2016). 
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Also, the Twinning instrument has already recorded nearly two decades of implementation 
history: initially in the EU accession candidates from Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) and then as part of the ENP. This track record presents Twinning policymakers with 
ample opportunities for an exchange of experience and further improvement of the 
instrument. Civil servants from EU member states with prior Twinning experience have already 
been in higher demand than those without the same, which is reflected in the preferences of 
the ENP beneficiaries concerning their future Twinning partners and during the formation of 
Twinning consortia among EU member states (see also Figure 3). 28  Amassing Twinning 
expertise and best practices from various countries and regions may improve Twinning 
programming in the future and help avoid past errors. 
Figure 3. Participation of EU member states in Twinning projects in Ukraine since 2007 
 
Note: Completed projects as of April 2018.  
Source: DG NEAR, European Commission. 
Furthermore, the new member states that have joined the EU over the past 15 years have 
recent transition experience and historical and socio-linguistic commonalities with the EaP 
neighbours. For that reason, the new EU member states offer specific added value to Twinning 
projects in Ukraine compared with the older member states.29 The memories of reforms in 
their home countries are still fresh in the minds of civil servants from the CEECs, as they often 
participated personally in the transitioning of their countries to the EU’s standards of 
democracy and market economy (including being Twinning beneficiaries themselves). At the 
                                                        
28 Fabienne Bossuyt and Dmytro Panchuk, “The Participation of CEECs in EU Twinning Projects: Offering Specific 
Added Value for EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood?” East European Politics and 
Societies and Cultures 31 (2): 334–59. 
29 Ibid. 
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same time, many older member states have at their disposal experience of running well-
established and reputable administrative and economic systems. Therefore, by identifying the 
comparative advantages of CEECs and the older member states and their points of 
complementarity, the EU may further improve the effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine 
and the broader region. 
Finally, Twinning projects in Ukraine and other EaP countries may benefit from a more 
coordinated and consistent interaction with other initiatives by the EU, its member states or 
other international and domestic actors, such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the United 
States. The EU can boost this dialogue through coordinated Twinning programming in policy 
areas like banking and finance, justice and home affairs, and public administration, where such 
complementarities exist. Apart from the international actors, domestic civil society 
organisations promoting reforms have also been on the rise in Ukraine. In view of that, the EU 
could adopt a more inclusive approach by encouraging the input from different civil society 
networks active in policy areas of the Twinning instrument. 
Threats 
Our analysis has revealed a number of threats for the effective implementation of Twinning 
projects in Ukraine, on both the EU and the Ukrainian sides. Among the most common threats 
on the Ukrainian side are perpetual institutional instability, the limited autonomy of public 
servants, a low level of transparency of Ukraine’s public sector and the unclear security 
situation due to the war in the east of the country. On the EU side, the varying qualifications of 
the participating civil servants and possible incompatibilities between the administrative 
systems of partners are the main threats. 
Although Twinning projects are planned and implemented in relative autonomy from the 
incumbent leadership, the public institutions hosting such projects in Ukraine have often been 
vulnerable to changes in the political weather at the top. Most senior civil servants, heads of 
ministries, departments and agencies hosting Twinning projects are political appointees. With 
every change of government or president (and such changes have been frequent in Ukraine), 
the leadership of the institution is replaced, jeopardising the previous achievements of 
Twinning projects in that institution. New department heads are often disinterested or even 
dismissive of what their predecessors did. For example, a Twinning project on the agricultural 
land market in 2013–15 sought to prepare the legal and institutional ground for lifting a 
moratorium on agricultural land sales in Ukraine. While securing initial support from the 
authorities, the project endured a change of political leadership and the appointment of a new 
department head, whose political party was rallying strongly against lifting this moratorium.30 
As a result, the seemingly successful project fell short of its purpose and goals. 
                                                        
30 Interview with a Dutch civil servant, Amsterdam, 21 March 2016. 
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Also, when the department head leaves, that individual’s personal assistant, head of staff and 
other personnel may leave too, posing numerous complications for the remaining project team. 
In extreme cases, public personnel who participated in a Twinning project have been laid off. 
Given the deeply ingrained hierarchical system of public administration in Ukraine, it takes a lot 
of effort for the remaining staff to put the respective project back on track.31 Some Twinning 
participants also complained of the limited autonomy of middle-range civil servants in Ukraine, 
even when it comes to making routine decisions, without obtaining consent from higher-
ranking officials. Such prior approvals are also problematic and time-consuming, which results 
in unnecessary delays over the course of the project.32 For many mid-level civil servants in 
Ukraine, showing extra initiative means risking one’s job. 
In addition, Twinning projects are threatened by unexpected and far-reaching organisational 
shifts in the beneficiary institution. With nearly any change of leadership in Ukraine, various 
public agencies are renamed, reorganised or liquidated. As a result, Twinning projects tailor-
made for one institution become irrelevant after that institution ceases to exist or changes its 
scope of activities. Such unexpected shifts have wreaked havoc on many Twinning projects in 
this country, in both the preparation and implementation stages. Sometimes, the new 
beneficiary institution where the Twinning project is reassigned did not initially participate in 
the implementation and hence shows no interest in continuing with the project.33 It also comes 
as no surprise that such institutions have at times been slow to provide office space or 
additional resources requested by the member state participants. 
Another threat to Twinning operations in Ukraine is the generally low morale among civil 
servants (see also the section on ‘weaknesses’), who have to spend their extra working time on 
Twinning commitments. The bonus of participating in study visits to partnering member states 
(and getting to keep the per diem money) may not be a sufficient and appropriate motivator 
for Ukrainian bureaucrats tasked with the daily implementation of the project. With the taxing 
range of their other commitments, Ukrainian civil servants do not appreciate the benefits of 
Twinning and work half-heartedly as a result.34 To add insult to injury, under the circumstances 
of continuing institutional instability, many civil servants in Ukraine experience anxiety about 
losing their jobs.35 
The Euromaidan revolution and ongoing conflict in the east of the country have also taken their 
toll on Twinning cooperation in Ukraine. Several projects running during the tumultuous winter 
of 2013–14 were suspended for several months due to the security concerns of project 
                                                        
31 Ibid.; interview with a German civil servant, Berlin, 11 April 2016. 
32 Interview with a Danish civil servant, Copenhagen, 21 March 2016; interview with an Austrian civil servant, 11 
March 2016. 
33 Interview with a French expert, Paris, 5 April 2016. 
34 Interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 21 November 2014. 
35 Interview with a Danish civil servant, Kyiv, 5 May 2015. 
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partners from the EU.36 The change of political leadership in the aftermath of the Euromaidan 
revolution affected the institutional landscape in Ukraine and had a rather detrimental effect 
on some Twinning projects. One interviewee also reported that some of her Ukrainian 
colleagues were drafted into the army in the middle of the project – something that further 
dampened the morale of the project team.37 While the political and security situation in the 
country has stabilised somewhat and the ongoing hostilities are geographically far from most 
Twinning hosts in Kyiv, it is unclear how the situation will unfold in the coming years and 
whether it will have further adverse impacts on Twinning projects in Ukraine. 
Among the threats to Twinning on the EU side, some respondents referred to the lack of 
qualifications of some Twinning participants (mostly short-term experts) as weakening the 
effectiveness of Twinning projects.38 There may be several reasons for such a conclusion. First, 
due to disparities between the Ukrainian system of public administration and that of some EU 
member states, the latter’s experience may simply be irrelevant or incompatible with the 
Ukrainian realities. Second, some EU experts may not be motivated to learn about the 
beneficiary and often do just enough to get the next consultancy contract. Third, the process 
of selection of short-term experts is often driven by personal recommendations and 
acquaintances of the resident twinning adviser, project leader or the national contact point 
rather than by the experts’ qualifications. Similar issues are also present in the setup of 
Twinning consortia. The lead member states of the Twinning project may abuse their status by 
imposing their own experts who do not necessarily offer superior expertise compared with 
experts from junior member states.39 
Among the less critical threats to Twinning projects are the linguistic and intercultural barriers 
occurring when people from different countries work together on a daily basis. Many Twinning 
projects in Ukraine have suffered from interpersonal communication difficulties. Some of these 
difficulties have been resolved or tolerated, while others have led to significant delays and, in 
extreme cases, the replacement of the resident twinning adviser or other staff.40 Promoting a 
greater degree of cultural sensitivity in addition to better understanding of the goals and 
expectations of the Twinning instrument as such would be helpful in mitigating this problem. 
Conclusions 
Twinning is a sophisticated institution-building instrument, aiming not only to approximate the 
regulatory environment of the beneficiary countries with EU standards but also to build trans-
governmental and personal ties between civil servants across the borders. Based on the 
analysis of 50 interviews with Twinning stakeholders in the EU, Ukraine and other EaP 
                                                        
36 Interview with a Polish civil servant, Warsaw, 2 April 2015. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Interview with a Ukrainian civil servant, Kyiv, 20 April 2016; interview with a Ukrainian expert, 21 April 2016; 
interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 27 November 2014. 
39 Interview with a Ukrainian expert, Kyiv, 21 April 2016. 
40 Interview with Ukrainian civil servants, Kyiv, 22 April 2016. 
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countries, we identify a number of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in 
connection with the implementation of Twinning projects in Ukraine. In order to confront the 
weaknesses and threats and to capitalise on the strengths and opportunities offered by the 
Twinning instrument, we put forward several policy recommendations, which could help the 
EU improve this instrument and boost its effectiveness in the short and long run. While being 
particularly relevant for Ukraine, these recommendations can also further improve Twinning 
projects in other partner countries of the EaP and the ENP more broadly. We now conclude 
this policy brief by looking at the recent Twinning reforms introduced by the European 
Commission and assessing the extent to which they affect our findings.  
In July 2017, the European Commission rolled out a new Twinning manual, following a lengthy 
process of consultations with multiple Twining stakeholders from within the EU and the 
beneficiary countries in the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and IPA regions.41 The 
updated regulations seek to make the Twinning instrument more flexible and efficient. They 
cover a number of aspects related to Twinning implementation, such as flexibility, 
simplification, speed, harmonisation of Twinning projects under the ENI and IPA schemes, and 
streamlining the financial management of the projects. 
Four major changes have been introduced. First, the establishment of a six-month rolling work 
plan (in addition to the initial work plan) seeks to enhance the flexibility of the Twinning 
instrument by making it easier to take stock of the progress made and adapt project activities 
on the go. However, the initially agreed mandatory results seem to remain ‘a sacred cow’ and, 
just as previously, are not subject to change later in the project. Second, the new manual also 
cuts down on the time for preparation activities leading up to the launch of the project by 
setting more ambitious deadlines for the institutions involved. Third, the projects operating 
under the new guidelines will benefit from a more reflexive approach to specific sector reform 
developments and coordination with other donors and the expert community active in the 
sector. Last but not least, the European Commission puts a stronger emphasis on 
communication and the visibility of Twinning projects and their achievements in the beneficiary 
community and the EU. 
On balance, it will take a more comprehensive investigation to explore the extent to which the 
recently proposed changes have embraced the strengths and opportunities and addressed the 
weaknesses and threats of the Twinning instrument. Clearly, these changes have been 
necessary and long overdue, yet they seem hardly sufficient to become a game changer in view 
of the issues Twinning has been facing in Ukraine and other ENP countries. The process of 
Twinning reform should continue in such areas as the flexibility of the work plans, incentives 
for the beneficiary, better targeting of the Twinning agenda to the needs and capacities on the 
ground, and improved visibility. 
                                                        
41  European Commission, “Twinning Manual (Revision 2017)”, Brussels (2017) (https://ec.europa.eu/ 
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/twinning-manual-revision-2017-final-updated-09-08.pdf). 
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